Mill was receptive to all sorts of ideas, both plausible and implausible, which did not fit well with utilitarianism. He was, for example, inclined to think of equality, not just pleasure, as. He was able to think of himself as a utilitarian only by grossly expanding that notion to cover any doctrine which did not entirely rely, without the possibility of further explanation, on or God's commands. It is even doubtful whether he was a consequentialist in any sense. Mill's account (...) of moral obligation is not a maximizing, nor even a satisficing, one. And the account emphasizes the place of supererogation. There is no suggestion in Mill that one is obliged to do something merely because a teaching to that effect would be felicific. Far from there being an obligation to maximize, it would sometimes be wrong merely to make Pareto-improvements. Sympathetically understood, the account of obligation in Mill is more or less the same as one finds in Hobbes, with his theorems. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Are there specific moral rights connected with employment? Three putative rights are considered: The right to work, the right of the most competent to be chosen, and the right to equal pay for work of equal value. It is very commonly assumed that we enjoy one or another of these rights. This paper argues that none of these rights exists. After all, what would it be to infringe someone's right to work? And is not employment sometimes in someone's gift? (...) Again, if two people are doing work of equal value, and the contract terms are both generous and individually acceptable to the parties, why need these terms be the same? (shrink)

An analysis of the doctrine of the sanctity of life, and a defence of that doctrine against some trends in current ‘bioethics’, particularly as exemplified in Jeff McMahan's book ‘The Ethics of Killing’. (Published Online February 27 2006).

I start from Mill's words about Mansel and the problem of evil. In this dispute Mansel has generally been thought to have come off worst. However, Mansel was clearly right to this extent: that what would make a man a good man would not be the same as what made God good. This is because, quite generally, what makes something good of its kind, where we can talk about goodness at all, varies with the kind. With Aristotle we must say: (...) the criteria are fixed by the thing's ergon, or at least by something analogous. On this account, it would seem that God must be perfect, since as an intelligent agent He does supremely well what is in the nature of an intelligent agent to do. This seems to lead to the right solution to the problem of evil. But Mill also had something useful to contribute. He saw that there would be a consequent difficulty in regard to revelation. This difficulty seems to be severe and insufficiently discussed. (shrink)

The demands of morality ought to be intelligible. However they are not alwaysreadilyintelligible. Thus it is easy to see why we need good sense and courage, and why we should seek to live at peace with our neighbours. But moral necessity is not always that transparent. Furthermore the intelligibility we seek is perhaps not always of this kind. This paper illustrates these difficulties by considering certain basic and unshakable convictions we share about homicide and sexuality, two topics we tend to (...) think badly about. And it explores a significant similarity in the moral philosophies of Anscombe and Kant. (shrink)

This article discusses Elizabeth Anscombe's faith and her concept of faith, and the bearing of this on what it is for belief to be reasonable. Reasonableness requires that we make a rough distinction between what can and cannot be taken seriously. At the margin we will rightly be influenced by thinkers such as Anscombe who were well able to appreciate the philosophical consensus but were also prepared to disturb it. She disturbed it in a particular way: by asserting Christian teachings (...) robustly inimical to peace of mind. However she rejected many traditional defences of these teachings as presupposing a faulty understanding of rationality. The article attempts to assess what a more adequate understanding might be. (shrink)

Since critical standards impose restraints, inappropriate standards can over-restrain. Might there then be claims we can only assess satisfactorily with the aid of a less restrictive and detached approach than is current among philosophers of the present day? This article takes up a particular suggestion, put forward by John Cottingham, that this is indeed the case -- that there are regions of thought, particularly in regard to religion, which we can only explore with the aid of emotional sensitivity and immersion (...) in practices. I argue that sensitivity and immersion of this kind would be all too apt to lead us astray, and that the promised gains in what is (rather dubiously) called religious understanding would hardly be sufficiently interesting to be worth the risk. (shrink)